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 From the beginning of the 20th century to François Mitterrand’s presidential 
elections, French political geography seems to have opposed Catholic 
territories and de-Christianized territories.  When vote scores gained by the 
Right in the 1974 first presidential round are compared to the high religious 
practice rate mapped by Canon BOULARD in 1947, they show a striking 
correspondence, despite the lapse of some 25 years. However, this correlation 
– territories of high Catholic practice and right-wing voter turnout- was blurred 
from the 1980s, largely because Catholic faith practices collapsed, and Catholic 
membership sharply declined. In 1892, a census reported 98% of French 
residents as baptized people out of a population of 38 million (POULAT, 1956); 
in 1972, 87% were baptized. Today, it is estimated that only 67.7% French 
residents out of a population of 67 million are baptized. Moreover, only 30% of 
those born after 2010 are baptized, which is half less than in 1980 and three 
times less than in 1960. 
A new religious map has emerged: the non-affiliated (people declaring 
themselves as non-religious) have significantly increased since the 1970s, 
reaching 40%, when they were 0.2% in 1872 (POULAT, 1956). Most of them 
were baptized in the Catholic religion but completely raised as secular. This 
population is present across the whole territory, with some large areas where 
they are the majority, in formerly social-republican or communist enclaves. The 
Muslim population, coming since the sixties and even before from the late 
French colonial Empire, rose from statistical non-existence to a relatively large 
size (estimated between 5 to 11%). Muslims are concentrated in non-Catholic 
or less Catholic territories (the southern Mediterranean, the Parisian belt, Lyon 
and its periphery, North East). Other religions, which cumulate 4% to 5% of the 
population, are differently distributed: Historical Protestants, 2% today 
compared to 1.6% in 1872, are still present in their traditional enclaves but at 
quite low rates, between 0, 5 to 4%, excluding the Bas-Rhin department 
(department is an administrative territory created by the Revolution), where 
Lutherans represent 17%.  Historical Protestants are competing with 
Evangelical missionary churches - 1% in 2017, ten times more than in0 1950- 
which reinforce their presence throughout the country. The North, Paris, Bas-
Rhin department, Rhône department, Bouches-du-Rhône and Gard 
departments have the strongest concentrations of local Evangelical churches. 
French Jews, 0.7% of the population, compared to 0.1% in 1872, are 
concentrated in Paris and its inner belt, plus the Mediterranean area. Orthodox 
Christians from Slavic, Romanian and Armenian origins, Eastern Christians, 
Buddhists, Hindus, Jehovah's Witnesses and other small cults, statistically non-
existent in 1872, are now living in urbanized areas, according to their specific 
immigration history. Thus, Armenian Christians and other Eastern Christians are 
particularly present in Paris but also in Marseilles area for different reasons: 
ancient trade French connections with Ottoman Empire, Armenian and Syriac 
First War massacres, Lebanese civil war, recent terrorist persecution in Egypt, 
etc... 
With such a religious change, added to the deep secularization process of 
the Catholic French population, it seems obviously difficult to find the same 
correspondence between religious geography and French political orientations, 
as it was still possible during the 1970s. The aim of this small presentation, 
using the very stimulating research done by Jérôme FOURQUET and Hervé LE 
BRAS in 2014, will be to measure how far – according to their new maps-  
electoral geography retain a memory of the French religious-political past and 
whether they show us some current level of correlation between recent votes 
and present religions in France. 
 
Catholic-Secular locations explaining Right and Left votes from 1870 to 1981 
 
Until recently, French religious and political geographies overlapped. 
When compared, the geographical distribution of votes for the Right in the first 
round of 1974 presidential election (2) and that of religious practice in 1947 (1) 
are strikingly similar: The Right and Catholicism in France cover the same 
bastions, with the great West, Alsace, Lorraine, Franche-Comté, one belt  from 
Switzerland to the Basque country through the Southern Massif Central. 
Conversely, de-Christianized areas such as Limousin, the Mediterranean coast, 
most of the Paris Basin, the Garonne Basin tend to vote on the left. The only 
exception concerns Southern part of the Paris Basin, from Yonne to Sarthe, 
which voted more for the Right in 1974 than its historical religious tepidity 
would seem to suggest.  
1. Catholic practice in 1947. Public source 
 
1. Christian territories 
2. Christian and secular territories 
3. De-christianized territories 
 
 
Historically, the Right-wing vote characterized Catholic areas under the 
Third Republic (1875-1940). During this long-standing period, compared to 
some others in French constitutional history since the Revolution, regular 
elections were held by male universal suffrage. The remarkable research on 
French electoral mapping, conducted by François GOGUEL, shows that Right 
and Left areas were the same in the 1902 elections as in the 1974 elections 
(GOGUEL, 1964). 
2. Rightist votes in 1974.  Fourquet-Le Bras 2014 (1)   
 
Similarity between political and religious geography until the 1970s has 
its distant roots in the Revolution era. A detailed map, drawn by historian 
Timothy TACKETT, shows the French territorial division in 1791, after the 
establishment of a national Catholic Church (TACKETT, 1986). On November 27, 
1790, the Assemblée Legislative voted a law known as the Civil Constitution of 
the Clergy, which destroyed the thousand-year canonical Catholic Church 
organization. It introduced inner clerical elections for bishops and direct 
external elections by the people for priests, as civil clergy. This law then obliged 
each priest to take an oath to the new Constitution. Law enforcement in the 
French provinces was tumultuous and uneven. Certain territories refused to 
organize the vote. Most of the clergy refused to be elected and to swear fealty 
to the new regime. At the end, the elected priests or jurors remained in office. 
The refractory priests or non-jurors were forced into exile or became 
clandestine. After several changes, the new law punished them with death.  
3. Rates of refractory priests in 1791. Tackett (1986) 
  
France of the jurors takes shape vis-a-vis France of non-jurors. The 
refractory provinces were not initially opposed to the Revolution. Rather, they 
objected to the extension of parliamentary authority and the legal 
homogenization imposed by it in the name of the Nation (that form of vertical 
centralism later termed Jacobinism). Refractory provinces were peripheral, 
with their own peculiar history, which enjoyed certain privileges: Alsace, 
Lorraine and Franche-Comté had belonged to the Holy Roman Empire for many 
centuries; Artois and Flanders benefited from urban liberties before they were 
included to the Kingdom in the aftermath of wars; Provincial state assemblies 
existed since the middle age in Bearn, Bretagne, Provence, Languedoc, 
Dauphiné, and Bourgogne. Some of them became French very late, by wars or 
by royal marriages. In these regions, the refusal of refractory priests and the 
lethal fate they could face, contributed to a rejection of the Revolution and the 
Republic. Over the long term, the geographical distribution of refractory priests 
corresponds to that of sustained Catholic religious practice and right-wing 
voting patterns, from the 19th to the first 20th century. On the other hand, the 
geographical distribution of juror or “constitutional” priests overlaps with less 
practicing regions, or with regions that began to be de-Christianized before the 
Revolution, as some part of Provence and the Paris Basin. 
 
Catholic secularization, secular de-Christianization, religious newcomers 
(1980’s-today) 
 
As demonstrated by the maps drawn in the FOURQUET-LEBRAS 2014 
report, France presents a new religious profile today. The study was conducted 
as a collaboration between a pollster and a geographer. Pollster Jérôme 
FOURQUET provided 51770 individual questionnaires, from 51 cumulative IFOP 
surveys (French Institute of Public Opinion) between 2011 and 2014, at the 
department level; Geographer Hervé LE BRAS drew the maps. Questionaries’ 
tools (cellphone and internet), combined with cumulative waves of surveys, 
allowed them a very good coverage of the metropolitan territory. For all 
surveys, addresses of interviewed people were noted. 13,295 townships have 
been recorded. In addition, for the largest cities, interviews were randomly 
collected between neighborhoods or districts. Population in the cities become 
more precisely visible, especially in Paris.  
What do new maps teach us? What do we learn from them? 
The changing maps of French religious practice not only reveals the deep 
secular spreading among Catholics, joining the long-standing and enlarged 
dechristianization of non-religious people, but also its records some discernable 
Catholic retention in precise locations and some revival among historical 
Protestant and Jewish minorities. While they continue to reflect historical 
dividing, new maps are appearing too. They identify, for the first time, locations 
and practice rates of other religions in places that no longer fit the past 
religious geography of France. 
Catholic–Secular division remains, Catholic practice collapse with local retention  
At first, Sunday mass attendance, which was held by the majority in 
many regions and had remained frequent in the others more secular, sharply 
declined. The decline already began in the 1960s. Since this decade, practice 
rates have dropped to levels three or four times lower, both by abrupt steps 
(the one first precisely in the 1960s and the other one in the early 2000s) but 
also by continuous decline. In Comment notre monde a cessé d’être chrétien; 
Anatomie d’un effondrement (How our world has stopped being Christian: 
anatomy of a collapse), historian Guillaume Cuchet reports how sociologist 
(and Canon) Fernand Boulard was stunned by the decline he studied between 
1965 and 1968, as one of “exceptional intensity" (BOULARD, 1971). Boulard, 
was then the first to predict the coming collapse, based on his survey of the 
youth attendance (BOULARD, 1968): young people were already half as less 
likely to attend mass in 1968 than in 1954. 
This fall primarily concerned Catholic regions. It also further reduced the 
already lower practice rates in the secular Republican and left-voting 
territories. In 2014, less than 15% of the adult population were classified as 
regularly practicing Catholics. The decline is particularly conspicuous between 
generations. In recent surveys, only 7% of young people, between 18 and 25, 
are identified as practicing Catholics, compared with 33% of older people over 
75. In 2015, as we have indicated it in our introduction, 30% of the children 
belonging to the same class age were baptized, compared to 40% in 2000 and 
80% in 1970. In some departments, such as Seine Saint-Denis, with high 
immigrant rates, only 10% of the children between birth and 7 years are 
baptized. Today, baby boomers are retired, and their children and 
grandchildren no longer feel as though they belong to the Catholic religion. 
Despite this trend, Catholic religion still retains a strong social presence with its 
educational, academic, media and charitable networks which maintain some 
Catholic ethos in French society. 
 
 
  
4. Regular and occasional Catholic practice in 2012. Fourquet-Le Bras 
2014 (6) 
 
Sociologists François-André ISAMBERT and Jean-Pierre TERRENOIRE, 
members of the GSR research center (now GSRL) at the Ecole Pratique des 
Hautes Etudes de Paris, showed, with a large research team they gathered, 
that, more than Catholic territories vs secular territories, there was emerging a 
strong correlation between the rates of religious attendance and socio-
professional classes. It was social difference that explained the voting divide 
between Right and Left: this longitudinal and collective sociological research 
established the growing gap in religious practice between social groups, 
regardless of territorial distribution (TERRENOIRE, 1994). 
Nevertheless, Traces of the ancient two Frances, one 'secular' and one 
other Catholic, are still present. They are still visible, with some newness at the 
center of the system, in the secular heart of the Paris Basin. ISAMBERT and 
TERRENOIRE show that rates of Catholic practice there rose instead of declined 
because of more upper socio-professional classes.  
5. Practicing Catholics in 2012. Fourquet-Le Bras 2014 (7) 
 
At first glance, Catholic practice areas are still visible. As said by 
Fourquet-Le Bras study’s writers, like eroded geological layers, general 
physiognomy is preserved, even if the main peaks have lost their height. There 
is a clear distinction between Catholic strongholds of the inner West, Bretagne, 
the Basque Country, Béarn, Southern Massif Central (parts of Aveyron, Lozère, 
Ardèche, Haute-Loire, Cantal), rural fraction of the North and, finally, a vast 
Eastern bloc running from the Marne river to Alsace and from the Meuse river 
to Jura. Catholicism thus preserves the peripheral situation which it occupied in 
the years 1940-1960 and long before that, in 1791. 
While, at first glance, the current distribution of practicing Catholics is in 
direct continuity with ancient Catholic bastions, a closer look reveals an 
attenuation and relative reinforcement over large areas. Practice has 
decreased less in the East than in the West, and the area of  more assiduous 
practice now extends to a part of Burgundy. On the other hand, the whole 
South, from the Basque Country to Savoy, has experienced a faster decline than 
the rest of the territory. At an even finer level, we still find peculiarities such as 
the weak religious practice observable in Toulouse, Cornouaille and Normand 
Cotentin. But the remarkable difference between the past and the present 
concerns the South-East (Nice area and Corsica) and the Paris Basin: these 
locations are more practicing, relatively, than fifty years ago and for Paris, even 
more so, two centuries ago, when the city formed the heart of irreligion.  
If Catholic religious practice has increased in Côte d'Azur and Corsica, 
while it sharply dropped in Catholic strongholds of the West and South, 
compared to the 1960s when rates were still at 40%, this is partly explained by 
the local population aging, and by the influx of wealthy retired people from 
across France (the most practicing age group today). Otherwise, the strong 
demographic growth experienced for years in the Mediterranean coast has 
accelerated the de-Christianization phenomenon, cumulating in growth of 
secular people, Muslims and other religions belongers.  
Moreover, by mapping religious practice rates in municipalities with 
populations above 5,000 inhabitants in Île-de-France, the FOURQUET-LE BRAS 
report shows that a new Catholic landscape is emerging in that region. In Paris 
intra muros, religious practice is positively correlated with the socio-economic 
profile of specific districts (arrondissements): the more bourgeois the district as 
16th, 7th and 8th arrondissements, more the higher the rate of Catholic practice. 
In some districts like the 20th one, practice rates are lower than 10%. In the 
area surrounding the capital, rates are identical. Beyond the immediate 
periphery of the capital, the gap is similar between bourgeois and more 
popular cities. All those from north eastern part of Yvelines department to 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye and all those from the south western flow leading from 
Boulogne-Billancourt to Versailles, without exception, are characterized by an 
above-average Catholic practice, as well as Sceaux, Fontainebleau and Chantilly 
areas. On the other hand, the rest of Seine-et-Marne, Val-d'Oise, areas close to 
Trappes, those of Essone department center and south appear as Catholic 
desert. Only 28% of Seine-Saint-Denis inhabitants and 38% of those in Val-de-
Marne department declare themselves Catholic today. 
6. Catholic practice in Île-de-France in 2012. Fourquet- Le Bras 2014 (10) 
 
So, from an original provincial distribution, the geography of Catholicism 
has evolved towards general social distinction, what suggest that practice rates 
found throughout the national territory, with its relative increase in areas that 
were not "very" Catholic 50 years ago. A correlation could be made between 
the practice retention of wealthy Parisian France and Catholic. 
General non-religious growing  
What about non-religious people in France? Canon BOULARD’s 1947 map 
seems still valid. At the South of the Loire river, the non-religious nearly 
surround the twin Catholic and Protestant bastions. That also correspond to 
"red peasants" areas, where the communist vote has long been important.  At 
the North of the Loire river, the non-religious remain quite numerous in the 
Paris Basin. In the East, conversely, the closer you get to the Rhine river, the 
more people claim to have a religion, even if they do not practice it, and the 
more people claiming to have no religious beliefs are also a minority.  
7. Non-religious people in France in 2012. Fourquet-Le Bras 2014 (14) 
                  
 
Nevertheless, general de-Christianization seems to overwhelm BOULARD’s 
map. It continued and accentuated in the French center and spread along the 
largest western communication corridors. A large secular Paris Basin appears, 
expanding from the Somme river to the borders of the Sologne river and from 
Le Havre to Reims cities, with Île-de-France departments as epicenter. Further 
in the South-West, and less marked, remains another early focus of 
dechristianization, including Limousin, Bourbonnais, part of Poitou and 
Charentes.  
 
Historical Protestants retention  
 
Despite a smaller number of believers than for Catholics, the data 
provided by the IFOP surveys made it possible to draw up the contemporary 
geography of historical Protestantism in France (Reformed Church, Lutheran 
Church, French Evangelicals). Put in perspective with the geographical 
distribution of old bastions of safety for Protestants ensured by treaties at each 
truce of the religious wars in the 16th century, two historical areas still shelter 
‘native’ Protestants: in the South, the Cevennes mountains and Ardèche (in 
majority  from the Reformed Church). In the North, Alsace and Lorraine (more 
of Lutheran origin). There are still 17.4% of Lutheran protestants living in Bas-
Rhin department, 7.3% in Haut-Rhin. There are 7.2% reformed Protestants in 
Gard, 6.8% in Drôme, 4.2% in Ardèche. They declined throughout the South 
West. A nucleus subsists in La Rochelle wide area. In other regions, historical 
protestant presence is now residual: 0.5% in Côte d'Or or Côtes-d'Armor 
departments. Historical Protestantism has disappeared in the North of France.  
8. Historical Protestants in 2012. Fourquet-Le Bras 2014 (13) 
 
 
Historically, French Protestants became secularized sooner than 
Catholics. They are now even less practicing than Catholics, but they are joined 
by new parishioners, often of African origin, with greater attendance appearing 
in the Paris belt communities, bringing youth and momentum to those old 
white churches.    
 
Jewish specific location and practice revival  
 
The 2014 study to which we refer, did not map Jewish population. It can 
nevertheless be found elsewhere, and it is possible to overlap other maps on 
Jewish population with the 2014 study questionnaires. This population is 
mainly located in Paris, in the Paris region, in Alsace, in Rhône-Alpes, in Midi-
Toulouse and on the Mediterranean coast. The newspaper La Croix has drawn 
up one map based on a 2014 IPSOS survey (another survey French agency), 
that we reproduce here.  
 9. French Jewish population in 2014. Source IFOP-La Vie-La Croix, 2014 
 
 
 The Jewish population in France represents 480,000- 550,000 people or 
0.7% of the population. Its profile has changed a lot since the Roman Empire. It 
almost disappeared after the royal expulsion decree in 1394 and since 1498 
from Provence, then newly included in the Kingdom. Coming back from across 
German borders after the Revolution, the Jewish population grew anew due to 
migrations from Eastern Europe in the late 19th century and the 20th century 
thirties. French Jews were mostly Ashkenazi before the Second World War. But 
Ashkenazi population was in turn decimated by Vichy complicity with German 
genocide: only 2,500 from the 75,700 Jews deported to concentration camps 
survived while the rest hid or fled by the coasts, Switzerland and to the South. 
8,000 orphans survived as well, remaining hidden and entrusted to French 
families during the war. After the Second World War, the Jewish population 
was reconstituted by returning contingents or immigrant surviving refugees, 
then by Maghrebi Jewish immigration – All Algerian Jews were already French 
citizens when they left- at the time of decolonization. Descendants of 
Maghrebin Jews or Seferiades now represent 70% of the French community.  
  
 If there is no scientific survey on this population’s religious practice, 
previously diversified and largely secularized, there are signs of de-
Secularization and of religious revival in the face of growing antisemitism, 
diffuse acts of violence and Islamist terrorism in particular that affected this 
community (Toulouse 2012, Paris 2015). 
 
 
 
Evangelical growth and strong practice  
"New" Protestants appear in 2014 report mapping, grouped under the 
label Evangelicals. If it is not possible to capture their precise membership in 
the IFOP questionnaires (as Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Methodists, small 
independent cults) and thus on the 2014 maps, we can see where they are 
located. Initially implanted in Protestant traditional regions (mainly Alsace, 
Southern Massif Central and lower Rhone Valley), the new Protestant Churches 
gradually spread over the territory and increased their presence in Paris, but 
also in the largest other cities, such as Lyon, Grenoble, Marseille.3 We 
reproduce here two maps drawn by the Federation Evangélique de France, 
which shows the growing presence of these Churches from 1971 to 2010. 
 
10. Evangelical new Protestants. Le Figaro, 14.06.2010. Public source 
 
 
 
The 2014 report and other surveys on Protestantism in France, for 
example that of 2017 by IPSOS4, count them as 1%. There have been closely 
studied by one remarkable team of sociologists in a study conducted since 
2009 by Sébastien Fath and Martine Cohen, both belonging to GSRL of Paris: 
 
3 Livret Cartographique de la Fédération Evangélique de France  
http://www.1pour10000.fr/public_files/fck/etude_statistique_eglises_2010_daniel_liechti_cnef.pdf  
4  https://www.reforme.net/actualite/societe/sondage-les-protestants-en-france-en-2017-1-qui-sont-les-
protestants/  
Dieu change à Paris (God is changing in Paris)5. This team tells us about 
emerging sensitivities:  American-Evangelical, Pentecostal, Charismatic, ethnic 
Churches brought by North American, Caribbean, South American and African 
missionaries. They are particularly dynamic and active in Île-de-France, 
contributing to Protestant 'creolization', as Sebastien Fath’s formula to describe 
this new Parisian Christianity. These new churches are converting young 
people, more willing to attend and to read the Bible than their age classes. The 
proportion of converts in these Churches reaches up to 48%, against only 11% 
among the Lutheran-Reformed protestants, who are overwhelmingly born in 
historical Protestant families6. New protestants represent 26 % of all 
Protestants in France today, compared to 17 % in 2010. 
 
Urban location of other religions and small cults 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that location of "other religions" 
(Orthodox and Eastern Christians, Buddhists, Hinduists, Jehovah's Witnesses, 
small cults) is the same: those religious groups are gathered in provincial cities 
and in Paris, bringing to light their urban implantation which reflects a double 
phenomenon of immigration and conversion. 
11. Other religions and cults in 2012. Fourquet- Le Bras 2014 (16)  
 
 
 
5 Dieu change à Paris, programme de recherche du CNRS- GSRL https://www.campus-condorcet.fr/La-
recherche-et-la-formation/La-diffusion-des-savoirs/conference/43/Dieu-change-a-Paris  
6 62 % of converts are Catholic, 27%  non-religious, 2%  Muslim, 2017 IPSOS Survey on French Protestants, 
https://www.reforme.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Ipsos-Enque%CC%82te-aupre%CC%80s-des-
protestants.pdf 
Muslims: Eastern and Parisian polarization 
The size of the Muslim population is the subject of public and scientific 
controversy in France. Given the current legal prohibition of collecting religious 
data for the state censuses and administrative documents, available figures 
vary from 4 to 8 million people (and even almost 9, as in the 2017 Pew 
Research Center poll on Muslim Population Growth in Europe 2017).  
How to understand such a variation in estimates, which feeds the 
invasion fantasy and demographical-religious mutation fear in French opinion, 
both issues which carry important political consequences (notwithstanding the 
legitimate concern for Islamist terrorism)? According to an IFOP survey for Le 
Figaro newspaper conducted online in October 2012 among a representative 
sample of 1,736 people, 60% of French people consider influence and visibility 
of Islam in France too important7. It leads them to Western-Christian or 
reversely to secularist awakening that runs from the extreme Right to the 
extreme Left. 
In the IFOP polls used by the 2014 Jean Jaurés Foundation report, only 
3% of the respondents declared themselves as Muslim: compared to the total 
population, this total represents only 1.8 million people. This figure is then far 
below those usually published. Other IFOP surveys, carried out differently, give 
a result closer to 4.5% of Muslims, practicing AND non-practicing, in the total 
population. 
12. Muslim population in France in 2012. Fourquet- Le Bras 2014 (15) 
 
 
7 Les Français et le catholicisme, 50 ans après Vatican II, https://www.IFOP.com/publication/les-francais-et-le-
catholicisme-50-ans-apres-vatican-ii/   
The geographical distribution of Muslims appears in the 2014 study to 
center around large territorial poles, much wider than those of Protestants. 
They correspond to labor migration in employment pools, from the 1960s to 
1980s, then followed by family reunification from the Maghreb and French-
speaking Sahelian and Muslim sub-Saharan African regions: a very high 
concentration is distinguishable in the Paris belt, in the areas surrounding Lyon 
and Grenoble, the Rhone river corridor, the Mediterranean coast from Toulon 
to Sète, with Marseilles as epicenter and Corsica. Outside these areas, Muslims 
find themselves in the urban sets of the South-West. They have no statistical 
existence in the Alps core, in the great West, on the Atlantic Southern coast, 
nor in the Massif Central.  
 
New religious map- new political map: what similarity? 
 
Given the long-standing relationship between Catholic or secular 
presence and political temper of French territories, could the Catholic religious 
decline, coupled with concomitant progress of non-religious and non-Catholic 
population be a direct cause, while scantily evoked, of political redistribution 
and furthermore, of the new contemporary divisions in French politics? 
First, did the Catholic practice retractation put an end to the division 
between Catholic and non-Catholic territories inherited from history? The 
follow-up of the European Union treaties votes maps shows a rather 
remarkable continuity, which allows to conclude that this is not the case. The 
political divide still exists. However, in other elections, including presidential 
elections, a sort of transfer seems to have taken place, according to the results 
presented in FOURQUET-LEBRAS‘study. The formerly Catholic regions, rather 
rightist, are drawn closer to the left, as the religious practice has weakened. 
The traditionally de-Christianized regions have slid to the right. However, this 
transfer movement has been blurred by the Front National party in several 
regions. This party has made an inroad into the left electorate in traditionally 
de-Christianized regions. It has also made an inroad into the right-wing 
electorate in the secularized Catholic regions. In both cases, its progression 
covers areas occupied by the Muslim population. Is it a coincidence?  Has 
Emmanuel Macron’s victory in 2017 recomposed the landscape? 
Pro and anti-European vote 
In 2005, the No vote in the referendum on the treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe was like an earthquake in French political life. The 
regions that voted Yes almost exactly match the traditional bastions of 
Catholicism. We find here a legacy of the post-war Christian-Democratic Party 
sensitivity – this party disappeared in the 1960’s - which carried the European 
construction in the 1950-1970’s and represented the permanence of traditional 
Catholic disdain for central State authority.  Ancient Catholic lands had voted in 
favor of the referendum proposed by General de Gaulle in 1969 about his 
constitutional project to create major regions with elective institutions, while 
much of the country had refused them, leading to President de Gaulle’s 
resignation. Strong regionalism of the formerly Catholic regions echoes in the 
defense of the European Union, as the Union of the Regions. 
There is a similar geographical distribution for the referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Referendum after referendum, the center of the 
Paris Basin joined the Catholic regions in this European choice. In Paris, the 
liberal sensibility of French economic elites met the European vibe of the 
French Socialist Party and the pro-European Catholic bias, when religious 
practice remains an important amongst a part of the French upper classes 
there concentrated. 
13. The Yes vote to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 
2005. Fourquet-Le Bras 2014 (24)  
 
The presidential vote in favor of François Bayrou in 2012, leader of the centrist 
MODEM party, also mirrors the geographical distribution of Catholicism. In a 
recent book (LE BRAS, TODD, 2013), this phenomenon has been clumsily 
described as "zombie Catholicism". Although churches remain deserted on 
Sundays, populations of long-time Catholics regions recognize themselves in 
the MODEM party discourse, moderate, social and pro-European.  Meanwhile, 
they are insensitive to the Front National discourse, which made exit of the 
Union one of its great political struggles. 
 
Catholics turn left, the non-religious leave the Left 
 
The European overlap cannot hide that the two Frances, the Catholic and 
the secular, have permuted their political orientations since the 1980’s: the 
great West and Massif Central turns to the Left, the Paris Basin, the 
Mediterranean and the Garonne valley to the Right. Pro-François Mitterrand 
votes compared to pro-François Hollande votes in the second round of 1981 
and 2012 presidential elections is enlightening. Most of the leftist gains in 2012 
concern historical Catholic areas: Léon, Morbihan, Île-et-Vilaine, Mayenne 
bocage, Cholet, Vendée, the Basque Country, Southern Massif Central. In the 
center and the south of the Massif Central, where the religious practice was 
strong and greatly diminished, the Left even sharply progresses. The great 
West, where the religious practice was very present and where its regression 
was fast, votes also turn left. Without doubt, the Socialist Party whose 
discourse has evolved since the late 1970’s and early 1980’s abandoning 
Marxist references, class struggle, school war, this party increased its audience 
significantly, in territories still marked by Catholicism but on secularization 
process. François Hollande even benefited from a better support by practicing 
Catholics in Christian-Democratic traditional regions, as Bretagne, the Basque 
Country, Alsace and Southern Massif Central. 
However, the permutation is not fully verified, according to FOURQUET-
LEBRAS’ comments. The North-eastern border, a zone of strong traditional 
practice and then sharp decline, experienced only a slight push to the Left. 
Same thing in Aquitaine and Poitou-Charentes where the gains for the Left 
were better. In the region of Toulouse, in Gard and Hérault departments and in 
the whole Rhône-Alpes region, so three areas of Catholic tradition, all of them 
experienced a decline in religious practice. But there, the Left has strongly 
regressed between 1981 and 2012, while the Catholic collapse should have 
benefited it.  
14. Gains and Losses for the Socialist Party in 2012 Presidential elections. 
Fourquet-Le Bras 2014 (21) 
 
 
The Front National party, Muslim Presence: Present votes hypothesis 
The 2012 Presidential elections final map hides another map, which shows Le 
Front national extreme-rightist gains at the first round.  
 
15. The Front national ‘s vote in 2012 Presidential elections first round. 
Fourquet-Le Bras 2014 (20)  
 
This map - and it does not prejudge all other very relevant analyses made to 
explain this extreme right-wing rise, especially that of incomes and work gap in 
the country – seems to recover the map of Muslim population presence. France 
seems to split into two new and large West-East axes: a moderate Western 
axis, as right and left high scales without a powerful Front national:  this axis 
has few pockets of Muslim population or, when it is massive, as in Paris, it is 
included in a consequent religious melting pot;  a "reactive" Eastern axis, where 
the Front National wins votes from Right and Left: there, the Muslim 
population is more important, ranking from 10% to 20% in some focused areas 
and even 25% in Marseilles, in the face of Catholic or left-secular depression. 
 Thus, in the great West, in the Western Pyrenees and the wide South-East of 
the Massif Central, the historically strong Catholic practice has greatly 
diminished, but the Muslim population is weak: the Left has gained a lot, the 
Right has maintained its scores and the Front National has gathered few votes. 
In long-standing de-Christianized territories, traditional bastions of the Left, 
part of Aquitaine, Poitou-Charentes, the Center region and Limousin, the Left 
has remained relatively stable, and the Right too:  the Muslim population is 
there also little present. 
On the other hand, in areas where Catholicism remains important or even 
when it plays a modest role, Catholic votes remain to the Right and the Front 
national increase comes from ancient left-popular voters. This is the case in the 
Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Somme river area, Alsace, Corsica and Lorraine, but also in 
the wide Paris Basin, Roussillon and Provence. At last Paris and the Parisian 
belt: the Muslim population is important, but the Catholic population as we 
have seen, as well as other religious minorities and population without religion 
are important too: The Front National does not make an inroad. 
CONCLUSION 
Let’s continue our hypothesis with the 2017 presidential elections. 
France of Emmanuel Macron in the first presidential round faces that of Marine 
Le Pen. The two Frances we have just described confront each other. The result 
is again striking compared to the map of Muslim population drawn by 
FOURQUET and LE BRAS:  the more the Muslim population is concentrated, the 
more Marine Le Pen gains votes. Macron's France overlaps with lesser or weak 
Muslim presence or a presence included in wider pluri-religious locations, 
where also practicing Catholics cohabit with a highly secularized population. 
16. 2017 First Round Presidential vote. Source Ministère de l’Interieur, La 
Croix ‘ mapping 
 
 
In the second round, Emmanuel Macron won 66% of the voters and 
Marine le Pen 33.9%. However, the map established by the newspaper La Croix 
after the second round, shows in dark points all cities where Marine the Pen 
gained the best rates. The map draws a Frontist France still very present under 
Macron’s victory.   
17. Second round results of the 2017 French presidential elections. Source 
Ministère de l’Interieur, La Croix neswpaper cartography 
 
 
At the end of this presentation, what could be ascertained? We started 
this description by the two-Frances historical landscape, divided between 
Right-voting Catholic and Left-voting secular territories; we have seen a first 
switch between the 1980’s and the 2000’s, by Catholic left-turning 
secularization and non-religious voters’ left-leaving turn. Then we have noticed 
that this second process was stopping in the 2000’s, in territories with 
relatively high rates of Muslim population. The Front national party (called the 
Rassemblement national since 2018) gains votes from secularized Catholic and 
non-religious voters. By consequence, the last presidential elections drew two 
new religious-political landscapes of France: that one resisting to the Front 
national’s growth, by adding Catholic-colored and non-religious voters in areas 
of extended religious pluralism with Muslim low presence. When Muslim 
presence is higher and concentrated, the Front national party wins votes.          
The political future of France is not yet written. It could be paradoxically 
decided by the political turn of self-declared Catholics, as swift vote. They are 
either taking over the identity narrative - this narrative paints Christian 
civilization as soon submersed by Muslim migration and European Union 
liberalism-  In this case, Catholics are finally getting closer to the Front National 
party  - what they weren’t in the recent past - and will give this party the 
Catholic voices it always failed to obtain... Self-declared Catholics will either 
keep their moderate center-right/right-wing votes, that characterized them in 
the past.  Despite their disappointment over Macron, they can be that decisive 
part of a moderate 'right-left' coalition in the next elections. And this coalition 
will defend the European Union and its promise of prosperity and freedom. In 
truth, the self-declared Catholics don’t seem to take this second path, but the 
contrary8. In this future or perhaps already accomplished swift, it will not be 
the last paradox of this story that the Republican future of France would held in 
the hands of the French Catholic (henceforth) minority. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Jerôme FOURQUET, A la droite de Dieu : le réveil identitaire des catholiques, Paris, Cerf éditions, 2018 
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